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In this paper we use information on the cyclical variation of labor market participation to learn 
about the aggregate labor supply elasticity. For this purpose, we extend the standard labor 
market matching model to allow for endogenous participation. A model that is calibrated to 
replicate the variability of unemployment and participation, and the negative correlation of 
unemployment and GDP, implies an aggregate labor supply elasticity along the extensive 
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The elasticity of aggregate labor supply has important implications for many policy ques-
tions, such as optimal taxation. In the literature, there has been a tension between the
elasticities estimated in micro-econometric studies, which tend to be relatively low, and the
elasticities that are implicit in macroeconomic models of the business cycle. This debate
is documented in Chetty et al. (2011, Table 1), and we reproduce the key numbers in our
Table 3. While some of these numbers may be disputed, several recent papers have worked
to reconcile the order of magnitude diﬀerence between estimates of the extensive margin
labor supply elasticity based on micro-econometric identiﬁcation strategies (0.28) and the
Frisch labor supply elasticities typically needed in RBC style macro models (2.3). These
papers are surveyed in Keane and Rogerson (2011, Section 2.4).
The purpose of our paper is to illustrate that there need not be a discrepancy between
micro- and macro-elasticities, if one interprets the macro-evidence in the light of a stan-
dard search model of the labor market. We enrich the Mortensen-Pissarides model by a
participation decision of workers. Then labor supply is reﬂected in labor market partic-
ipation. The ﬂuctuations of participation over the business cycle suggest a labor supply
elasticity at the extensive margin in the range of 0.3 to 0.4 for men and 0.4 to 0.65 for
women. This is well in the range of available micro-studies, although it is higher than
what Chetty et al. (2011) suggest. The large ﬂuctuations in employment, which are usu-
ally regarded as an indicator of high labor supply elasticity, come from changes in labor
demand, reﬂected in the number of vacancies posted by ﬁrms. Variations in vacancies can
be a consequence of wage rigidity, vacancy cost ﬂuctuations, or other sources. The issue
is, in our perspective, not micro vs. macro, but labor supply vs. labor demand. Labor
supply is well measured by recent micro-econometric studies, while labor demand, similar
to physical investment, is very volatile over the business cycle.
In a nutshell, our results are driven by the following facts. Over the business cycle,
wages and job ﬁnding probabilities vary considerably. For example, the standard deviation
of log average hourly earnings, relative to that of GDP, is 74 percent, and the wages of
new jobs ﬂuctuate even more, cf. Table 4. The job ﬁnding probability ﬂuctuates much
more than GDP. In contrast, the relative standard deviation of log participation is only
23 percent. A high labor supply elasticity (unity or above) would imply a much stronger
response of participation. A very low labor supply elasticity (0.3 or lower) would imply an
even lower variability of participation, or a smaller correlation of participation and GDP.
These two statistics, the variability of participation and its correlation with GDP, identify
the range of admissible labor supply elasticities.
1Since our estimates are derived from a structural business cycle model, the results
are only credible if the model is successful in explaining the dynamics of labor market
aggregates over the business cycle. Earlier attempts to incorporate participation into a
standard matching model (Veracierto 2008) generated a positive correlation between the
unemployment rate and GDP, which is highly counterfactual. In contrast, we calibrate our
model so as to generate the strong negative correlation between unemployment and GDP
that is observed in the data. To make this possible, it is necessary to replicate the observed
strong procyclicality of the job ﬁnding probability.
Apart from providing an estimate of the aggregate labor supply elasticity, our model
provides a simple framework that combines endogenous labor supply with search and
matching frictions in a way that is consistent with key labor market data. We ﬁnd that
endogenous participation helps in explaining the variability of employment over the cycle.
It gives a greater magniﬁcation of technology shocks than the standard matching model.
In recent years, there have been a number of papers that model participation decisions
in a job matching framework. In many respects, our model is similar to
Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), who study labor market policies in a model with endoge-
nous participation. They focus on steady state analysis. Krusell et al. (2009) go a step
further by introducing worker saving. We do not do this, in order to keep the model
as simple as possible. Pries and Rogerson (2009) have emphasized the heterogeneity of
expected durations in participation spells and implications for cross-country diﬀerences.
Krusell et al. (2011) is complementary to our analysis. They focus mainly on explaining
the gross ﬂows between employment states and allow for both worker saving and changes
in worker productivity. In independent work, Shimer (2011) shows that wage rigidity is
helpful in explaining business cycle facts about participation. This is compatible with our
ﬁndings below. Chang and Kim (2006) and Chang and Kim (2007) derive the labor sup-
ply elasticity from the cross-sectional distribution of labor productivity and capital, but
they have no matching friction in their model. For a more detailed discussion of their work,
see Section 4.2.3.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and
some analytical results. Section 3 discusses the data and calibration. Section 4 provides
numerical results for the calibrated model and Section 5 concludes.
22 The model
2.1 Overview
Our aim is to stick as closely as possible to the standard Mortensen/Pissarides matching
model, to focus on the issue of labor supply elasticity, and to keep the analysis transparent.
In particular, our model does not aim at replicating the gross ﬂows between employment
states. We do therefore not model the stochastic processes of the individual productiv-
ity variables, which give rise to large ﬂows between employment states, but rather keep
individual productivities constant for each worker.
We also keep the model simple in other respects. We do not model endogenous search
intensity, nor the intensive margin of labor supply, nor are there endogenous job separations
in equilibrium. Most importantly, we abstract from worker saving and thereby from wealth
eﬀects on labor supply. This will be discussed in Section 2.5.1.
However, we have to deal with the problem pointed out in Shimer (2005) and
Costain and Reiter (2008), called the “unemployment volatility puzzle”, that the standard
matching model does not generate enough variation in vacancy positing, and therefore in
labor market tightness and job ﬁnding probabilities. The strong procyclicality of those
variables is an essential feature of the data, and plays a crucial role for our analysis. We
achieve it in the model by a combination of two features.1 First, we assume ﬂuctuations
in vacancy cost, which are potentially correlated with ﬂuctuations in productivity. This
captures an eﬀect proposed by Pissarides (2009), and is consistent with micro-foundations
via credit frictions proposed by Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2010). Second, we assume
a certain degree of wage rigidity, but only to the extent that is consistent with the ﬁndings of
Haefke et al. (2008). We do not claim that our formulation is a valid structural explanation
of the unemployment volatility puzzle. We rather use it as a shortcut, because we think
that the exact reasons for the strong ﬂuctuations in vacancy posting are not essential for
our results. In the same spirit, Krusell et al. (2011) take these ﬂuctuations as exogenous.
1The literature often deals with this problem by a calibration similar to
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). An essential element of this calibration is a small job surplus. In
our model, the average job surplus is not a free parameter, but is determined by the cross-sectional
dispersion of market and home productivity, cf. the discussion in Haefke and Reiter (2006). We therefore
cannot follow this calibration strategy.
32.2 Model Setup
2.2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a unit mass of one-person households, which we call work-
ers. At any time t, workers are heterogeneous in four dimensions: their gender (male or
female), which is indicated by the subscript g with g ∈ {m,f}; their idiosyncratic market
productivity yi; their gender speciﬁc mean home productivity hg; and their employment
status s(i,t), which can be either employed, s(i,t) = e, or not employed, s(i,t) = n. The
idiosyncratic component of market and home productivity diﬀers across households, but it
remains constant over the life of each household.
Men and women only diﬀer in the cross-sectional distribution of market and home
productivity. For each g ∈ {m,f}, the log of market productivity is distributed normally
with mean logyg and standard deviation σy,g. We do not model home productivity as an








log˜ ht = ρh log˜ ht−1 + σh￿h,t (1b)
where g(i) denotes the gender of worker i, ¯ hg is the gender-speciﬁc median of home pro-
ductivity, and the parameter hy measures the strength of the relationship between home
and market productivity. The i.i.d. shock ￿h,t is standard normally distributed and can be
interpreted as a shock to aggregate labor supply. It decreases average home productivity
and leads to an inﬂow of workers into the labor market.
Employed workers decide whether to continue an employment relationship or not. Since
the shocks in the model are suﬃciently small, there are no endogenous separations in
equilibrium. However, existing matches are separated exogenously with constant ﬂow
probability χ. For those who are not employed, the decision is whether or not to search
for a job. Those who search ﬁnd a job with probability pW per period, which only depends
on the aggregate state of the economy, not on any action by the worker. Non-employed
agents who search for a job are called unemployed and by deﬁnition participate in the
labor market. The mass of unemployed households in the economy at time t is denoted
by Ut. Those who do not search for a job are called non-participants, or out of the labor
force. We assume that there is no cost of switching between unemployment and non-
participation, and a household’s decision to participate is therefore independent of whether
the household participated last period or not. In this sense, non-participation is not a
4third (predetermined) labor market state, but only a decision variable of the household;
we discuss this in Section 2.5.2.
All the non-employed agents engage in home production. We think of this utility
as all kinds of returns to being at home, from taking care of your children or growing
vegetables in your backyard to moonlighting. The utility ﬂow of worker i then equals his
or her respective home productivity hi,t unless the worker searches actively, in which case
the utility ﬂow reduces to hi,t(1 − γt). The variable γt measures the cost of job search,
expressed as fraction of home production. Later we will calibrate this parameter by the
time spent on searching. For reasons of numerical stability, we allow search costs to be
random, being i.i.d. over time and across households. However, we think of the variability
of γ as being very small.
Those who are employed do not enjoy any home production, but they earn a wage w.
Following the bulk of the matching literature, we assume that wages are determined in
each period by generalized Nash bargaining. The wage thus depends on the output of the
match and on home productivity, among other things.
2.2.2 Production
Production takes place in one-worker ﬁrms using labor input only. Output of the ﬁrm in
period t equals Ztyi, the product of aggregate productivity Zt and of idiosyncratic market
productivity yi of worker i who is matched to the ﬁrm. Aggregate productivity follows an
AR(1) in logs, such that
logZt = ρZ logZt−1 + σZ￿Z,t (2)
where ￿Z,t is a standard normal i.i.d. shock.
2.2.3 Job Creation
To form new employment relationships, workers must search and ﬁrms must post vacancies.
All ﬁrms oﬀer the same conditions (wage etc.) to a worker of a given characteristic, and
therefore all vacancies are identical. Opening a vacancy comes at a ﬂow cost κt, which
varies over time
κt = ¯ κ˜ κt (3a)
log ˜ κt = ρκ log ˜ κt−1 + σκ￿κ,t. (3b)
with ￿κ,t a standard normal i.i.d. shock. We allow for nonzero correlation ρZ,κ between
aggregate productivity and vacancy posting costs. For negative ρZ,κ this setup has a similar
eﬀect as the ﬁxed and variable vacancy cost components in Pissarides (2009).
5Table 1: Timing Within a Period.
1. The aggregate productivity shock realizes.
2. The idiosyncratic search costs realize.
3. Participation decisions and separation decisions are taken; vacancies are created.
4. Matching and exogenous separation shocks realize.
5. Production, consumption etc. take place.
In line with the literature, we assume that the total number of new matches M is




Here U is the size of the unemployment pool (the non-employed who search), V is the total
number of vacancies, µ is a scaling parameter and λ is the matching elasticity. Deﬁning
aggregate labor market tightness θ ≡ V/U, we obtain the matching probabilities of the
















2.2.4 Timing of Events
Within each period, events happen in the order presented in Table 1. Exogenous sepa-
ration and matching takes place at the same time. This implies that a worker who gets
exogenously separated cannot participate in this period’s matching market, but has to wait
(and be unemployed) for at least one period. Workers who are matched this period cannot
be separated the same period. This timing serves to simplify the model setup because each
agent only faces one binary shock per period (being separated or not when employed; or
being matched or not when unemployed). Furthermore, people who decide to search will
be matched (or not) the same period (i.e., without productivity shocks happening in the
meantime) which ensures that every matched agent accepts the current job oﬀer.
Employment Et denotes the mass of employed workers after separation and matching
shocks of period t have realized. Using the above timing assumptions, and anticipating
6that there are no endogenous separations, the dynamics of employment is summarized by
Et+1 = (1 − χ)Et + p
W
t+1Ut. (8)
Remember that U is not equal to non-employment (1−E), but only contains those workers
who decide to search.
2.3 Recursive Formulation
2.3.1 Participation and Separation
The value function at time t of an employed and of a non-employed agent of gender g and
market productivity y are denoted by V E
g,t(y) and V N
g,t(y), respectively. Value functions of
time t are deﬁned after matching and separation shocks have realized. The time subscript
t captures the eﬀect of aggregate shocks on the value function.
Employed agents decide whether to continue working or whether to separate and leave

















where Wg,t(y) denotes the wage of the worker with characteristics g and y. The non-





















The value of the search cost at which the worker is indiﬀerent between participation and











7A worker employs a simple threshold strategy and participates if γ ≤ γ∗
g,t(y). Therefore
(10) can be written as
V
N



























where Fγ (γ) denotes the distribution function of the search cost.
We think of the variation in γ as very small. In the limit, γ is a constant, and the
participation decision is characterized by the threshold y∗
g,t, such that a household of gender
g at time t participates if and only if y ≥ y∗
g,t.
If the support of γ is bounded away from zero, it follows from (11) that a worker
participates if and only if the value of employment is strictly greater than the value of
non-employment. Since the idiosyncratic market productivity is constant for the worker,
and if the ﬂuctuations in aggregate productivity Zt are suﬃciently small, then the worker
will never decide to quit, so there are no endogenous separations.
2.3.2 Job creation
The value of having a job ﬁlled with a worker of gender g and market productivity y is
denoted by Jg,t(y). Since total output is the product of aggregate productivity Z and
individual productivity y, it satisﬁes






In order to create a vacancy, ﬁrms have to pay a vacancy posting cost of κ(Z) per unit
of time. Free entry assures that the expected net value of a vacancy is zero. Therefore,





















g,t(y) denotes the cross-sectional distribution of market productivity among unem-
ployed. We see from (14) that, in order to compute the expected value of a vacancy, a ﬁrm
needs to know the composition of the unemployment pool, represented by F u
g,t(y). This
is an inﬁnite-dimensional aggregate state variable, which is the reason why the analysis is
substantially more complicated compared to the model without participation. In (14b),
the integral is taken over all market productivities and over both sexes, which reﬂects the
assumption of a single, non-segmented labor market.
2.3.3 Equilibrium Wage and Labor Market Tightness
Wages are determined by generalized Nash bargaining. The corresponding ﬁrst order
condition is









with bargaining weight α(Z) of the worker. Similar to κ, α is allowed to vary over the
cycle as a function of Z, such that ﬁrms potentially grab a bigger part of the surplus in
booms:
αt = ¯ α − ∆α(Z − ¯ Z), (16)
for ∆α ≥ 0.
2.4 Some Analytical Insights
2.4.1 Aggregate Productivity and Participation
To obtain some insight into the properties of our model, consider the limiting case where
the search cost γ is a constant. For a given aggregate labor productivity, there is a critical
value yc of market productivity where households are indiﬀerent between participating and
staying at home. The analysis is done separately for each gender g ∈ {m,f}, but in the
following the gender subscript is omitted for notational convenience.
Participation for each gender is given by the mass of agents with idiosyncratic market




f(lny)dlny = 1 − F(lnyc)
where f(.) and F(.) denote the density and cumulative distribution function of log mar-















9The response of participation to changes in aggregate productivity is determined by two
factors: the change in the threshold value yc, and the mass of unemployed households at
the margin, relative to total participation.





1 − β + χβ
α(Zyc − h) (18)
γh is the per period utility reduction when searching, 1/pW the expected number of periods
spent searching. At the threshold this utility loss is oﬀset by the premium of wages over
the outside option, which is basically the worker’s share of the ﬂow surplus.
Taking the total derivative of the log of (18), and evaluating at Z = 1, we get (recall




dlnyc − (1 − λ)dlnθ =
1
yc − h
















































i.e. the mass of agents at the participation threshold times the change in the threshold.
From (21), there are four factors determining the response of participation:
1. The cross-sectional dispersion of lny. The higher the variance, the lower is the density
f at a given quantile of the distribution, i.e., for a given participation rate.
2. The average participation P. For a normal distribution, the ratio
f(lnyc)
1−F(lnyc) increases
monotonically in lnyc, which means that it decreases monotonically in the partici-
pation rate. For participation rates above 50 percent, the numerator decreases and
the denominator increases with participation.
3. The relationship between market and home productivity hy. A higher hy causes larger
changes in the threshold value yc, therefore higher elasticity. Another interpretation
of this is that a higher hy makes the diﬀerence between market and home productivity
less dispersed, therefore the density of this diﬀerence at the margin becomes larger.
104. The response of labor market tightness to productivity. A tighter labor market
reduces eﬀective search costs. Notice that this eﬀect is scaled by
yc−h
yc . If search costs
are small anyway, h is close to yc, and tightness has little eﬀect on participation.
2.4.2 Labor Supply Elasticity
Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) stress that, in a dynamic framework, there is not just one
number that measures labor supply elasticity. In the framework of our model, we deﬁne
labor supply elasticity as the long-run reaction of labor market participation to a change in
aggregate labor productivity, keeping labor demand conditions (i.e., the job ﬁnding proba-
bility) constant. With “long-run reaction”, we refer, technically speaking, to a comparative
steady state analysis. In the context of our model, this should be interpreted as the reac-
tion until a new ﬂow equilibrium in the labor market is reached. It does not include wealth
eﬀects from permanent changes in productivity, because there are no wealth eﬀects in our
model. Neither does it include very long-run decisions of households, such as education or
fertility choices.
To compare our deﬁnition to the estimates in the empirical micro literature, notice
two things. First, the labor literature studies the elasticity of employment, rather than
participation, with respect to wages. However, with constant job ﬁnding and separation
rates, employment is a constant fraction of participation in steady state, and therefore the
distinction employment vs. participation is irrelevant for our deﬁnition of the labor supply
elasticity.
Second, labor supply elasticity is usually deﬁned in terms of a response to wages, not
to labor productivity. We prefer not to do this, for two reasons. First, the wage is the
outcome of a bargaining process between workers and ﬁrms, not a parameter that workers
take as given. Second, there is not one wage, but the bargained wage is inﬂuenced by both
market and home productivity of the workers. In contrast, aggregate labor productivity is
an exogenous parameter in steady state. In any case, the distinction between wages and
labor productivity makes a small diﬀerence, because the elasticity of wages to productivity
is close to unity in steady state.
Using the chosen deﬁnition, it is clear that the determinants of labor supply elasticity
are described by the ﬁrst three points in the list of Section 2.4.1. The fourth point, namely
the response of labor market tightness to productivity, is a general equilibrium eﬀect that
reﬂects the labor demand decisions of ﬁrms. This eﬀect is not included in our deﬁnition of
labor supply.
112.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Worker Saving and Wealth Eﬀects
In the model, workers do not save. This has at least two important consequences. First,
workers do not engage in short-run intertemporal substitution between work in diﬀerent
time periods. This mechanism, which can lead to very high Frisch labor supply elasticities
in models of indivisible labor, was stressed in recent work by Keane and Rogerson (2011),
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2011), and Rogerson and Wallenius (2009). It is interesting that
our model explains the volatility of labor supply only through the cross-sectional varia-
tion in the participation margin, similar to Chang and Kim (2006). This complements
the recent paper by Krusell et al. (2011) who focus mainly on intertemporal substitution
in a model of large households where they impose exogenous job ﬁnding and separation
probabilities to study labor market ﬂows.
Second, wage increases do not have wealth eﬀects. We think that, within our model,
this eﬀect is not very big. One reason is that productivity changes have an autocorrelation
of less than 0.9 quarterly, so that the wealth eﬀect is clearly dominated by the substitution
eﬀect. Moreover, the wealth eﬀect is not relevant for the participation decision of a single-
earner non-employed household, because higher wages do not create a wealth eﬀect if the
household does not participate. The wealth eﬀect only comes into play for endogenous
quits, when the household has accumulated so much assets that it does not want to con-
tinue working, and for double earner household, where the wage of one earner aﬀects the
participation decision of the other earner (Faraglia 2003; Chang and Kim 2006). While
those are important issues, we think that for business cycle purposes, a model without
wealth eﬀects is a useful benchmark. The empirical success in explaining the movements
of participation supports this view.
2.5.2 Fixed costs
In our model, there are no ﬁxed costs of switching between non-participation and partici-
pation. The question is whether there are such ﬁxed costs, and whether they would aﬀect
the main results. We ﬁnd ﬁxed costs of switching hard to reconcile with the substantial
gross ﬂows between non-participation and participation. Using the CPS data described
in Section 3.1, we ﬁnd that each month, about 14 percent of the unemployed switch to
non-participation, and about 2 percent of the non-participants switch to unemployment.
Furthermore, we have experimented with ﬁxed costs in earlier work, and found that it had
little impact on the main results (Haefke and Reiter 2006, Footnote 4).
12However, there are probably ﬁxed costs of labor supply at a very long horizon. Those
include, for example, the costs of getting a professional education, or costs related to
fertility decisions. It is therefore important to interpret our results as labor supply elas-
ticities at business cycle horizons, not necessarily at very long horizons. We cannot rule
out higher labor supply elasticities in the long run, as was suggested, for example, by
Rogerson and Wallenius (2009). Similarly, the microeconomic studies, to which we com-
pare our results, are unlikely to pick up these very long-run elasticities.
2.5.3 Measurement Errors in Participation
Labor market participation is a somewhat vague concept, and diﬃcult to measure. In
practice, it is based on workers’ answers to survey questions. It could be that the reported
behavior is more sluggish than actual behavior. For example, some of the unemployed
might always say they are looking for work, although in reality they are only looking in a
boom, when conditions are good enough. Estimated changes in participation then under-
estimate true changes, and we underestimate the labor supply elasticity. This hypothesis
can be tested. If it is true, then in a boom, there are fewer non-participants who are
counted as unemployed, or more searchers who are counted as non-participant. In either
case, it implies that the measured NE-hazard increases more strongly in a boom than the
UE-hazard.
In the data, we ﬁnd the opposite. The covariance between the unemployment rate and
the log of the ratio of the NE-hazard and the UE-hazard equals 0.0860, which corresponds
to a correlation of 0.0733. This means that in recessions, when unemployment is high, the
UE-hazard drops even more than the NE-hazard. Therefore, although the NE-ﬂows are
substantial, the changes of unemployment over the business cycle are driven by changes
in the UE more than by changes in the NE-hazard. More precisely, if unemployment
is higher by one percentage point, the UE-hazard decreases by 8.6 percent compared to
the NE-hazard, a quite strong eﬀect. This serves as further evidence that the distinction
between unemployment and non-participation is an important one.
3 Data and Calibration
3.1 Data
We consider data for the time period 1979–2007. All statistics (except the means) in table 5
are reported for the log of quarterly series which have been detrended using an HP ﬁlter
13with smoothing parameter 105. Over this time, labor productivity deﬁned as GDP per
worker ﬂuctuated about 75% of GDP. Persistence measured by ﬁrst order autocorrelation
was high at 0.9.
We consider the entire population aged 16–99, male and female, rather than restricting
ourselves to certain age groups as the previous papers in this literature (Faraglia 2003;
Garibaldi and Wasmer 2005) have done. Even though the precise numbers we report are
not identical to theirs, the qualitative picture remains the same. The overall participation
rate averaged 65.8%, which can be broken down into 75.4% for men and 57% for women.
Persistence was high at .89. Moderate procyclicality at a correlation of .57 with GDP and
the low variability (23% of GDP overall, 19% for men and 35% for women) have so far
often been used as arguments to abstract from the participation decision. Veracierto (2008)
recently argued that a Mortensen-Pissarides style search and matching model cannot match
these low participation ﬂuctuations. For us, the low volatility of participation provides key
information for identifying the labor supply elasticity.
The employment population ratio is highly procyclical, as indicated by a .85 correlation
with GDP, and its variance over the business cycle is at 69% of GDP. Generating such strong
employment variation has been a challenge for many RBC models. Endogenizing the partic-
ipation decision is very helpful in this dimension, as discussed by Haefke and Reiter (2006)
and Veracierto (2008).
The unemployment rate ﬂuctuated substantially around its mean of 6.1%, with a stan-
dard deviation 7.4 times higher than that of GDP. As was pointed out by Shimer (2005) and
Costain and Reiter (2008), standard matching models have a hard time explaining the high
volatility, which will be a crucial issue in our calibration. The unemployment rate is also
highly persistent and strongly countercyclical with a correlation of −.85 with GDP. Repli-
cating this countercyclicality has been a major diﬃculty for previous models with search
frictions and endogenous participation (Faraglia 2003; Tripier 2002; Veracierto 2008) or
search intensity (Shimer 2004), because non-participants start searching at the onset of a
boom but take some time to ﬁnd a job. We will explain below that the problems of the
high volatility and of the strongly negative correlation are closely linked. To solve those
problems, it is crucial to capture the movements of the job ﬁnding probability. According
to Robert Shimer’s data, it averaged 42.5% for monthly rates, is strongly procyclical and
ﬂuctuates 5.25 times as strongly as GDP.
A lot of attention has recently been given to wages. Using diﬀerent approaches and data
sets, several authors (Pissarides 2009; Haefke et al. 2008; Hagedorn and Manovskii 2010)
ﬁnd that the wage relevant for job creation ﬂuctuates strongly with labor productivity.
Similar to Michaillat (2011), our preferred estimate is 0.8 for the elasticity of wages with
14respect to labor productivity. In addition to time series volatility, we also consider the
cross sectional distribution of wages for men and women separately. Women’s wages are
on average 25.7% below men’s wages. We capture the cross-sectional wage dispersion by
considering average ratios of the median to the 10-th percentile for each sex.
3.2 Calibration
The model period is 1/48 of a year, corresponding roughly to one week. The following
parameters are set to conventional values, and are kept constant across diﬀerent calibra-
tions. The interest rate is set to 4% annually, so β = 1/1.041/48. For the elasticity of
matches w.r.t. unemployment we follow Reiter (2008) and set λ = 0.4. This is well within
the range of values that Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001, Table 3) report. With this value,
the model does equally well in explaining the variability of unemployment and the vari-
ability of tightness. If one uses a higher value, as Shimer (2005) and Rudanko (2009) do,
the model tends to underestimate the variability of unemployment, and overestimate that
of tightness. Following most of the literature, we set the worker’s share of the surplus α
equal to λ. We normalize the eﬃciency parameter µ in the matching function to 1, which
implicitly scales the number of vacancies but otherwise has no real consequences.
A parameter we take directly from micro data is search cost. Average search costs ¯ γ are
set, separately for each gender, to 6.56 percent of median home productivity. This reﬂects
the average time spent on job search of the unemployed, as percent of a 36 hours workweek
based on the American Time Use Survey for 2003–2006. As explained in Section 2.3.1, we
assume a small i.i.d. variation in search costs, for numerical reasons. This is speciﬁed in
Appendix A.
The autocorrelation parameters for the aggregate shock processes (2), (1b) and (3b) are
set independently of the rest of the calibration. To obtain the autocorrelation of aggregate
labor productivity, we identify it with average labor productivity in the data. We set
ρZ = 0.9970 at weekly frequency such that the process of labor productivity, aggregated
to quarterly frequency and HP ﬁltered with weight 105, has a ﬁrst-order autocorrelation
of 0.8974, which we ﬁnd in the data. Since we have no data to estimate persistence in the
ﬁrst order process for vacancy posting costs (ρκ) and aggregate home productivity (ρh) we
set both equal to ρZ for reasons of parsimony. Notice that our choice is close to the 0.91
estimated by Floden and Lind´ e (2001) for idiosyncratic productivity using U.S. data.
There remain 13 parameters which are set so as to make the model match 13 targets
(8 steady state targets and 5 second moments) in the data. These parameters can vary
between diﬀerent calibrations. Table 2 reports the values for the baseline calibration, next
15Table 2: Baseline Calibration
Parameters Targets
χ Weekly Separation Rate 0.844% Weekly Job Finding Prob. 12.92%
κ Vacancy Posting Cost 3.94 Unemployment Rate 6.1%
¯ hf Home Productivity for Females 0.2647 Participation Rate for Females 57.1%
¯ hm Home Productivity for Males 0.2618 Participation Rate for Males 75.4%
logyf Average Productivity for Females 0.77 Wage Ratio female/male 0.7734
logym Average Productivity for Males 1 Average Wage Male 1
σy,f Std.Dev. Female Market Productivity 1.036 P50-P10 Ratio for Females 1.76
σy,m Std.Dev. Male Market Productivity 1.065 P50-P10 Ratio for Males 2.06
σZ Stdev Aggr. Prod. Shock, Weekly 0.0012 Quarterly Std.Dev of GDP 1.35
σh Stdev. Labor Supply Shock, Weekly 0.0010 StdDev Partic. Rate, rel. to GDP 0.23
σκ StdDev Vacancy Cost Shock, Weekly 0.0258 StdDev Employment, rel. to GDP 0.69
ρZ,κ Corr. Agg. Prod. and Vac.Cost Shock -0.181 Corr. Unemployment and GDP -0.85
∆α Change in Worker Bargaining Power 2.275 Elast. of New Wages to Aggr.Prod. 0.8
to the targets that they match. To give some intuition, the table pairs each parameter with
a speciﬁc target that is prominently inﬂuenced by this parameter, although all parameters
are determined simultaneously. For the calibration targets, we set the steady state wage
of men to unity, which is just a normalization. The job ﬁnding probability was taken
from Shimer (2007). He reports a monthly probability of 42.51%. We compute the weekly
probability as 1 − (1 − 0.4251)1/4.
Apart from scaling GDP ﬂuctuations, we have four second moments as calibration
targets, namely the relative standard deviations of employment and participation, the
correlation of unemployment with GDP, and the elasticity of average wage w.r.t. aggregate
productivity. To match those, it turns out that the calibrated standard deviation of the
labor supply shock is slightly higher than that of the productivity shock. The standard
deviation of the vacancy cost shock is about 20 times higher than that of the productivity
shock, and the two shocks are negatively correlated (-0.181). This is in line with the
idea of Pissarides (2009), but notice that the required ﬂuctuations in vacancy costs are
large. The derivative of ﬁrms bargaining power w.r.t. aggregate productivity is 2.275. If
productivity increases by 2.12 percent, which is the unconditional standard deviation of
aggregate productivity in the baseline calibration, the bargaining power of ﬁrms increases
from 0.6 to 0.6 + 2.275 · 0.0212 = 0.6481, a moderate increase.
Next to this baseline calibration, we also deﬁne a one-shock calibration. It is the same as
the baseline, except for setting σh = σκ = ρZ,κ = ∆α = 0. The only shock is to aggregate
productivity, which is set so as to match the variability of GDP, and wages are perfectly
16ﬂexible. This does not change the steady state of the model, but we have dropped the
calibration targets referring to second moments. This calibration comes closest to the
standard version of the Mortensen/Pissarides model.
4 Results
4.1 Labor Market Fluctuations
Before going to the baseline calibration, we ﬁrst consider the results for the one-shock
calibration, which does not target the second moments. So it is lacking all the extensions
that are necessary to generate a high labor market volatility. In particular, there are no
labor supply or vacancy cost shocks, and wages are perfectly ﬂexible. Results are shown
in Table 7. The defects of this parameter combination are clearly visible. The relative
standard deviation of unemployment, relative to GDP, is only 0.63, and unemployment is
almost uncorrelated with GDP. The reasons for this negative result will become clear later.
However, the model does very well in one dimension: the relative variability of participation
is 0.22 for men and 0.35 for women, compared to 0.19 and 0.35 in the data. This is
remarkable, because the calibration does not target those variables. Recall from Section 3.2
that home productivity is identical across households, conditional on gender. Participation
is driven by the cross-sectional distribution of market productivity, which is identiﬁed by
the cross-sectional distribution of observed wages. Interestingly, the model explains the
volatility of female relative to male participation. Female participation ﬂuctuates about
50 percent more. The reason for this is that the average female participation rate is
lower, so that the participation threshold lies closer to the modus of the distribution,
which gives a higher density at the threshold (cf. the discussion in Section 2.4.1). This
result is consistent with the ﬁnding of Bargain et al. (2011) that women have signiﬁcantly
larger extensive margin labor supply elasticities in countries with low female labor force
participation rates.
Table 6 displays the results for the baseline calibration. Notice ﬁrst that the variability
of participation is not substantially aﬀected by the recalibration. It is mainly the cross-
sectional distribution of market productivity, not the relative standard deviation of shocks,
or wage rigidity, which drives this variability. With the baseline parameter values, the
model matches a number of second moments quite well, apart from those that were used
for the calibration. In particular, the correlation of participation with GDP is 0.69 in the
model, for both men and women, while in the data it is 0.57 for men and 0.45 for women.
The relative standard deviation of wages matches those for all workers in the data. One
17dimension in which the model does not do so well is that it generates a too high volatility
of the job ﬁnding probability. This is probably because the job separation rate is constant
in the model, so that all the variability in unemployment comes from variations in the
ﬁnding rate, while in the data part of it is explained by variations in separations.
Our calibration targets the strong negative correlation between the unemployment rate
and GDP, in contrast to earlier attempts to incorporate participation into a standard
matching model (Veracierto 2008). To understand how this works, it is useful to look at
the impulse response functions in Figure 1. Panel a) gives the response to a one percent
technology shock in the baseline calibration.2 Numbers are percentage deviations from
steady state. Notice that the responses of the unemployment rate and of the job ﬁnding
probability have been scaled down by a factor of 10, to ﬁt well into the same graph. We see
that participation, and therefore unemployment, increases upon the technology shock, re-
ﬂecting improved market opportunities over conditions at home. Despite of this, the shock
generates a negative correlation between unemployment and GDP, because the job ﬁnding
probability goes up strongly, so that the unemployed are quickly absorbed into employment.
The strong eﬀect of productivity on the job ﬁnding rate in this model is due to wage rigid-
ity; in a one-shock calibration of the model, which suﬀers from the Shimer critique, it is well
known that the increase in job ﬁnding is small (Shimer 2005; Costain and Reiter 2008).
Then unemployment increases even more and stays above the steady state level for a long
time. This is precisely what happens in the one-shock calibration, for which the results
are shown in Panel b).
Next to the pro-cyclical job ﬁnding rate, two more aspects of the calibration are re-
sponsible for this success, as was already explained in Haefke and Reiter (2006). One is the
calibration of the cross-sectional distribution of market productivity. If there is not enough
heterogeneity across workers, too many are close to the participation threshold, such that
the initial procyclical response of unemployment is bigger. To oﬀset this eﬀect, an even
stronger response of the job ﬁnding probability is necessary. Another, quantitatively less
important factor, is time aggregation. If the model is solved and simulated at a weekly
rather than quarterly frequency, new entrants into the job market can be absorbed more
quickly. If the weekly data are aggregated to monthly or quarterly values, the initial rise
in unemployment becomes less important. This can be seen by comparing the quarterly
correlations (ρ) with the monthly (ρm) and weekly (ρw) correlations reported in Tables 6–8.
Panels c) of Figure 1 displays the response to a ten percent vacancy cost shock. We
see that the shock reduces the job ﬁnding rate, but does little to participation. In our
2For this exercise, we keep the vacancy cost constant, although it is correlated with technology.
18calibration, the cost of searching is small, and it is therefore the comparison of home
vs. market productivity, not the probability of ﬁnding a job, which mainly drives the
participation decision (cf. the discussion in Section 2.4.1). Panel d) displays the response
to a labor supply shock, which turns out to be qualitatively very diﬀerent from a technology
shock. The increase in participation leads to a decrease in the job ﬁnding rate because the
composition of the unemployment pool deteriorates, which lowers the incentives to post
vacancies.3 This causes a sharp increase in unemployment. The correlation between GDP
and unemployment serves to discriminate between technology and labor supply shocks.
Notice that in all cases the response of participation is hump-shaped. This is because
households close to the participation margin increase their probability of participating,
as their critical level of the search cost declines. This temporarily increases the fraction
of non-employed households who participate, while those who happen to ﬁnd a job stay
employed, and therefore continue participating.
4.2 Labor supply elasticity
The parameter values of the baseline calibration reported in Table 6 imply steady state
labor supply elasticities of 0.403 for men and 0.646 for women. The values are well below the
preferred estimates of Keane and Rogerson (2011). They are above the extensive-margin
estimates cited in Chetty et al. (2011, Table 1), but we think they are well in the range of
recent micro estimates. For example, van Soest et al. (2002) estimate an extensive margin
elasticity of 0.72 for Dutch women. We cite this study, because it probably comes closest
to estimating the labor supply elasticity as we have deﬁned it. From those results, there
is no discrepancy between micro and macro elasticities.
The question then is: which features of the data identify the elasticity, and how robust
are our estimates? Are there other calibrations of the model that ﬁt the data similarly well
but imply diﬀerent labor supply elasticities? The estimates depend on our calibration of
the model. At least two concerns with this calibration come to our mind. First, the degree
of wage rigidity is uncertain. Second, the assumption of constant home productivity for
each gender appears arbitrary. We examine the two issues in turn.
3If market productivity increases, workers who were are at the border between participation and non-
participation now enter the labor market. Since their job surplus was small by deﬁnition, they reduce the
average match surplus (cf. the discussion in Haefke and Reiter (2006)).
194.2.1 Wage Rigidity
The cyclicality of wages is not easy to measure. Relevant for our purpose are the wages
for new hires. Our one-shock calibration uses the estimates of Haefke et al. (2008), which
are based on CPS data, but which come with substantial standard errors. Calibrating the
model with a higher degree of wage rigidity would lead to substantially higher estimates
of the labor supply elasticities. This is because smaller ﬂuctuations in wages give less
incentives to households to participate, therefore the observed ﬂuctuations can only be ex-
plained by larger elasticities. A natural case is where ﬂuctuations are explained exclusively
by productivity shocks (σh = σκ = 0). In that case, we are left with only two parameters
to calibrate (hy and ∆α). We use those to match the relative standard deviations of em-
ployment and participation. The results are reported in Table 8. The estimated elasticities
are now 0.577 for men and 1.026 for women, but the model generates two counterfactual
results: a very high correlation between participation and GDP, and a variability of wages
that is clearly below what is observed in the data.
4.2.2 Varying hy
Unfortunately, the covariance between home- and market productivity is not observed.
Our baseline choice of hy = 0 is natural, but arbitrary. Increasing hy, that is, increasing
this covariance, increases the labor supply elasticity, as was explained in Section 2.4. To
be compatible with the observed variability of participation, this has to be compensated
by a lower variability σh of the labor supply shock.
Table 9 summarizes the model results for varying values of hy. The ﬁrst column reﬂects
a case that can be considered a natural upper limit for hy. By setting hy = 0.236, the
variability of participation is matched without labor supply shocks, that means σh = 0. In
the following columns, hy gets reduced down to -0.6, at which the labor supply elasticities
are similar to what Chetty et al. (2011) suggest. The column hy = 0 refers to the baseline
case. To explain the variability of participation in each case, we have to increase the size
of the labor supply shocks. The size of the other shocks is not much aﬀected. The last
part of the table reports the statistics that vary most from one calibration to the next: the
correlation of participation (male and female) with GDP, the variability of wages, and its
correlation with GDP.
With hy = 0.236, the elasticities are 0.515 for men and 0.866 for women, considerably
higher than in the baseline case. However, this raises the correlation between GDP and
participation to a value of 0.9, whereas it is 0.57 for men and 0.45 for women in the data.
In the framework of our model, such a high labor supply elasticity is incompatible with
20the data.
To match the correlation of total participation with GDP, we need a value of around
hy = −0.15. In this case, the elasticity is 0.33 for men and 0.55 for women. A negative hy
may appear implausible, but it need not be taken literally. If there is variation in home
productivity h that is independent of the variation in market productivity y, it increases
the cross-sectional variation of y − h, just as a negative hy does. We do not allow for
independent variation in h because we do not know how to identify it.
The above elasticities are still a bit higher than the micro elasticities reported in
Chetty et al. (2011). To replicate those, one has to set hy around −0.6, as done in the last
column of the Table. This requires a standard deviation of the labor supply shock that is
more than twice as high as the productivity shock. Then the correlation of participation
with GDP is below what we ﬁnd in the data, and wages become more volatile than GDP.
Hence it is hard to reconcile those very low labor supply elasticities with some second
moments in the data. Our best estimates are therefore 0.33 for men and 0.55 for women.
4.2.3 Comparison with Chang and Kim (2006)
Our model is in many respects simpler than the one in Chang and Kim (2006), which
includes worker saving, two-earner households, and a stochastic process for idiosyncratic
productivity. Nonetheless, our estimated labor supply elasticities for the baseline case
(0.403 and 0.646 for men and women, respectively) are close to the individual compensated
labor supply elasticities reported in Chang and Kim (2006, Table 8), which are 0.41 for
men and 0.78 for women in their baseline model. This suggests that our simple model has
focused on the features that are most important for labor supply elasticities.
We go beyond Chang and Kim (2006) in two respects. First, we have stressed in Section
2.3 that it is the cross-sectional distribution of home vs. market productivity, not just of
market productivity, that drives the labor supply elasticity. This has led us to a slight
reduction in estimated elasticities. Second, we have introduced labor market matching into
the model, such that employment is driven to a great extent by ﬂuctuations in labor demand
(vacancy posting), which are inﬂuenced by changes in vacancy cost and by wage rigidities.
In this way we disconnect the labor supply elasticity from ﬂuctuations in employment and
unemployment.
215 Conclusion
We have extended a labor market model of the Mortensen/Pissarides type to allow for
endogenous labor market participation. The model explains the business cycle properties
of unemployment, labor market participation and wages well. Key to the empirical success
of the model are a degree of wage rigidity consistent with Haefke et al. (2008), a vacancy
cost shock that is negatively correlated with productivity shocks, and a careful calibration
of the cross-sectional distribution of market productivity.
This model suggest that the labor supply elasticity is between 0.3 and 0.4 for men
and between 0.4 and 0.65 for women, along the extensive margin. Adding an intensive-
margin elasticity of 0.54, as suggested by Chetty et al. (2011), gives an overall elasticity
close to unity. This elasticity should be interpreted as capturing the supply eﬀects that
are operative at business cycle frequencies. Elasticities at longer horizons might be even
higher, as stressed by Keane and Rogerson (2011).
These elasticities are slightly higher than the estimates reported in Chetty et al. (2011),
but well within the range of recent results in the micro-econometric literature. They are also
compatible with the macroeconomic business-cycle evidence, because the high variability
of employment and unemployment is not due to a very high elasticity of labor supply, but
to the large ﬂuctuations in vacancy creation. Those reﬂect the changing hiring incentives
of ﬁrms, not the labor supply elasticity of households.
A Numerical implementation
The model cannot be solved analytically, and even an exact numerical solution poses
important problems, for the following reason. Firms, when they decide on whether to
post vacancies, have to consider the cross-sectional distribution of the unemployment pool,
which determines the expected quality of the workers they are going to be matched with.
Even though we only consider small aggregate ﬂuctuations, such that only the households
in a neighborhood of the participation threshold are aﬀected in their participation decision,
a complicated distribution dynamics arises in this region.
In the theoretical model of Section 2, each household has constant search cost γ. Given
the aggregate state, the household either participates or not. The dynamics of participation
then depends precisely on the density of the unemployed at the current participation
margin. This density turns out to be hard to pin down exactly in the stochastic equilibrium.
Numerically it is much better to smooth out the household decision in the following way.
For each household, the search cost γ is uniformly distributed within (¯ γ −ε,¯ γ + ε). If ε is
22very small, only households very close to the participation margin will have a participation
probability in the interior of (0,1). To model the distribution, we consider a grid of n
types of households in that region, and for each type of household, the fraction that is
unemployed is an aggregate state variable. To achieve high precision, we need n in the
range of several hundreds. We solve the model by the methods described in Reiter (2009b)
and Reiter (2009a).
The theoretical model is the limit of the smoothed model with ε → 0 To see whether
we can trust the numerical solution, we vary both n and ε. This has no signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the results.
B Data Sources
All labor market series originate from the BLS website and are seasonally adjusted. Age
is 16 years and older. The participation rate series (Id LNS11300000); the unemployment
rate series (Id LNS14000000); the employment population rate series (Id LNS12300000).
The remaining series are all available via the FRED database. All are seasonally ad-
justed. Real GDP (2000=100) can be obtained via
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPC1/106.
Vacancies are measured by the help-wanted index
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/HELPWANT/10 (1987=100);
the wage series is average hourly earnings, total private industries
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/ahetpi/10.
It is deﬂated using the private consumption expenditure price index
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/pcepi/21 (Base 2000).
Labor productivity is measured as output per worker:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/OPHNFB and was deﬂated using the
GDP deﬂator.
When available, all series were downloaded at a monthly frequency and converted to
quarterly frequency by averaging. GDP and output/worker are at quarterly frequency.
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26C Tables and Figures
Table 3: Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin Aggregate Hours
Steady State micro 0.33 0.26 0.59
(Hicksian) macro 0.33 0.17 0.50
Intertemporal micro 0.54 0.28 0.82
Substitution (Frisch) macro [0.54] [2.30] 2.84
Note: reproduced from Chetty et al. (2011, Table 1).
Estimates in brackets show the values implied by the macro aggregate hours
elasticity if the intensive Frisch elasticity is chosen to match the micro estimate
of 0.54.
Table 4: Volatility of wages at business cycle frequencies
BP ﬁlter HP ﬁlter
Relative Auto Relative Auto
std. dev. correl. std. dev. correl.
Aggregate wage 1951-2001 0.41 0.92 0.43 0.91
1984-2006 0.85 0.92 0.84 0.93
CPS, all workers 1984-2006 0.44 0.91 0.67 0.92
CPS, new hires 1984-2006 0.68 0.80 1.09 0.71
Note: reproduced from Haefke et al. (2008, Table 2).
27Table 5: Business Cycle Statistics for Agegroup 16–99, Years 1979 – 2007.
Mean σx
σGDP ρ−1 ρx,GDP
Participation 65.83 0.23 0.89 0.57
Partic. Men 75.44 0.19 0.78 0.57
Partic. Women 57.07 0.35 0.90 0.45
Employment 61.81 0.69 0.98 0.85
Unempl.Rate 6.13 7.42 0.98 -0.85
Monthly Job Finding Prob. 42.51 5.25 0.94 0.81
Monthly Sep. Prob 3.49 2.31 0.59 -0.43
Avg. Hourly Earnings 14.81 0.74 0.99 0.44
Note: σx
σGDP: standard deviation of x, rel. to GDP
ρ−1: ﬁrst order autocorrelation
ρx,GDP: correlation with GDP.
Table 6: Model Results, Baseline Model
Parameters ηPM
Z : 0.403; ηPF
Z : 0.646; hy: 0.000
σZ: 0.0012; σκ: 0.0258; σh: 0.0010
ρZ,κ: -0.181 ∆α: 2.275
Moments Mean σx
σGDP ρ−1 ρx,GDP ρm
x,GDP ρw
x,GDP
Partic. Men 75.4 0.18 0.98 0.69 0.67 0.65
Partic. Women 57.1 0.29 0.98 0.69 0.67 0.65
Employment 61.8 0.69 0.97 0.91 0.89 0.87
Unempl.Rate 6.1 8.42 0.97 -0.85 -0.84 -0.82
JobFindProbWeekly 12.9 9.53 0.90 0.86 0.84 0.82
AveWage - 0.79 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.85
GDP - 1.00 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00
Labor Productivity - 0.56 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.86
Note: ηPM
Z , ηPF
Z : labor supply elasticity male and female, respectively;
σx
σGDP: standard deviation of x, rel. to GDP; ρ−1: ﬁrst order autocorrelation;
ρx,GDP, ρm
x,GDP, ρw
x,GDP: correlation with GDP at quarterly, monthly and
weekly frequency, respectively.
28Table 7: Model Results, One-Shock Calibration
Parameters ηPM
Z : 0.403; ηPF
Z : 0.646; hy: 0.000
σZ: 0.0019; σκ: 0.0000; σh: 0.0000
ρZ,κ: 0.000 ∆α: 0.000
Moments Mean
σx
σGDP ρ−1 ρx,GDP ρm
x,GDP ρw
x,GDP
Partic. Men 75.4 0.22 0.98 0.90 0.86 0.82
Partic. Women 57.1 0.35 0.98 0.90 0.86 0.82
Employment 61.8 0.30 0.99 0.84 0.76 0.62
Unempl.Rate 6.1 0.63 0.79 0.01 0.23 0.52
JobFindProbWeekly 12.9 0.42 0.99 0.87 0.78 0.58
AveWage - 0.88 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00
GDP - 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00
Labor Productivity - 0.92 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note: cf. Table 6.
Table 8: Model Results, Rigid Wages
Parameters ηPM
Z : 0.577; ηPF
Z : 1.026; hy: 0.357
σZ: 0.0010; σκ: 0.0000; σh: 0.0000
ρZ,κ: 0.000 ∆α: 6.847
Moments Mean σx
σGDP ρ−1 ρx,GDP ρm
x,GDP ρw
x,GDP
Partic. Men 75.4 0.19 0.98 0.91 0.89 0.87
Partic. Women 57.1 0.28 0.98 0.92 0.90 0.88
Employment 61.8 0.69 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.95
Unempl.Rate 6.1 7.20 0.97 -0.99 -0.98 -0.96
JobFindProbWeekly 12.9 8.28 0.90 0.99 0.99 0.98
AveWage - 0.11 0.95 1.00 0.99 0.99
GDP - 1.00 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00
Labor Productivity - 0.47 0.90 0.99 0.98 0.97
Note: cf. Table 6.
29Table 9: Model Results for Varying Values of hy
hy 0.236 0.000 -0.100 -0.150 -0.250 -0.500 -0.600
σh 0.0000 0.0010 0.0014 0.0015 0.0018 0.0024 0.0027
σZ 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012
σκ 0.0236 0.0258 0.0267 0.0271 0.0278 0.0291 0.0296
ρZ,κ -0.182 -0.181 -0.176 -0.174 -0.170 -0.164 -0.161
ηPM
Z 0.515 0.403 0.357 0.334 0.289 0.172 0.121
ηPF
Z 0.866 0.646 0.577 0.546 0.491 0.381 0.345
ρPM,GDP 0.89 0.69 0.61 0.57 0.50 0.38 0.34
ρPF,GDP 0.89 0.69 0.61 0.58 0.52 0.42 0.38
σW/σGDP 0.63 0.79 0.87 0.92 1.01 1.27 1.38
ρW,GDP 0.94 0.89 0.86 0.85 0.83 0.79 0.78
Note: ηPM
Z , ηPF
Z : labor supply elasticity male and female, respectively;
σx
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Note: The impulse responses of the unemployment rate and the job ﬁnding rate are scaled
down by a factor of 10.
Figure 1: Impulse responses
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